What’s next for Idlib?

There has been a temporary lull on the military and political fronts in Syria, indicating that the main actors are using this period to prepare for the major battles ahead.
And at the epicenter of the coming storm is Idlib. Turkey has increased the number of its armed forces to about 12 thousand at 140 bases in the specified province. They also train the insurgents, working closely with the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militants, who control much of the city and its surroundings, while fighting the Jabhat al-Nusra militants.
Turkey has also fortified itself in northeastern Syria. In October 2019, as part of the Turkish Armed Forces Operation Spring of Peace, a buffer zone was created between Ras Al Ain and Tell Abyad between Turkey and areas under Kurdish control. This enclave is politically and economically integrated with the bordering Turkish provinces.
The recent escalation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has provided Turkey with a new opportunity for military action. Ankara is reported to have sent about 1,500 Syrian militants to the Azerbaijani forces. Most of these fighters were tempted by the promise of a monthly salary of around $ 1,500. On October 5, it became known that 50 Syrian militants were killed.
Russia, another major player in the Syrian arena, has done a good job of helping Assad regain control of 65% of the country in an effort to stave off externally sponsored regime change. The Russian Aerospace Forces are also fighting the remnants of IS in the vast desert regions of Syria. Russia has successfully demonstrated its position as a great power. Now its main efforts are of a diplomatic nature: Moscow is the main guarantor of security for the regional powers.
The United States, another position in Syria, maintains a large detachment of more than 500 soldiers in Kurdish-controlled areas to prevent government forces from regaining control of the region’s oil wells while trying to contain Iranian expansion. On the diplomatic front, the United States is trying to unite the various Kurdish factions, for which the “Supreme Kurdish Administration” was created, which is tasked with developing a vision and strategy for realizing its long-term interests.
Iran is the oldest supporter of the Assad regime and has provided its own al-Quds militia to protect the government. Iranian-backed militants are part of government forces outside Idlib and will play an important role if hostilities resume.
Concerns over Turkey’s presence in Syria have spurred Arab interest in rebuilding ties with Damascus. Egypt has been particularly active in maintaining high-level official contacts. In addition to him, by early October, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain resumed their diplomatic missions in Syria.
What is the short-term forecast then? It is highly likely that the two-year Idlib impasse could result in a bloody struggle with heavy civilian casualties. If Turkey is unable to secede from the HTS militants, there will be direct clashes between its forces and the government forces, with serious military involvement from Russia. This will split relations with Russia and jeopardize Turkey’s neo-Ottoman activities in the region — in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Mediterranean — so it is likely that Ankara will prefer caution. At the same time, Syria’s future is uncertain: the coming weeks will witness massive carnage or herald a new dawn for the war-torn country.