Ways to solve the Syrian crisis
On the initiative of the Syrian opposition organization, a conference on “discussing ways to solve the Syrian crisis”was held in Berlin from July 31 to August 1 in Europe. It was attended by diplomatic delegations from some countries called “friends of the Syrian people”, prominent opposition figures, including former Prime Minister Riad Hijab, former head of the Syrian National Coalition Moaz al-Khatib and well-known Syrian opposition leader Burhan Ghalioun.
The current conference should be viewed more as an attempt by a number of forces in the EU to shift the activity of the Syrian opposition to the humanitarian aspect of the crisis in support of Brussels ‘ efforts to stop the negative consequences in the form of migration flows. It does not pretend to be a substitute for the negotiations in Geneva and Astana. Of course, the Europeans, within the framework of this conference, are trying to find new points of support, but as before, only representatives of the Syrian opposition, who have a serious power component in Syria itself, represent a real force.
Currently, the country has formed four models of governance: the Syrian Government of salvation “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) in Idlib; the opposition-led Syrian Interim Government in the north; the self-proclaimed Kurdish Autonomous Region in the northeast; and the Assad regime, supported by Russia and Iran.
Considering the advantages and weaknesses of each of them, it is quite obvious that only two can be successful in the long run: the Assad regime and the Syrian Interim government. The HTS-supported Syrian Salvation Government(SSG) has a serious support base in the form of displaced Syrians living in Idlib, but it does not have international recognition, and the HTS is considered a terrorist organization by all the main foreign players on the Syrian field — the UN, the United States, Iran, Turkey and Russia.
The Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern and eastern Syria, where serious water, fuel and agricultural resources are concentrated, is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces(SDF). For Turkey, the SDF are terrorists because of the ties of the People’s Self-Defense Units (YPG) that are part of them with the Kurdistan Workers ‘ Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization.
The Syrian Interim Government is in a slightly different position. Turkey has been and remains a key supporter of the JCPOA, and the resumption of border crossings promises a significant financial boost for the survival of this structure. International recognition also strengthens the JCPOA, giving it authority in the eyes of Western states as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
In recent years, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has won a military victory over the opposition forces. Many opposition members have fled the country or moved to areas controlled by the HTS or SSG, this has given Damascus a more “controlled” population in areas where it retains dominance. While Western states still oppose the regime in Damascus, some Arab countries have begun to revive relations with it. The US has said that it does not seek to overthrow the Assad regime, but rather to change its behavior. And, according to experts, Russia and Iran will be able to ensure the preservation of the regime.
This leaves two equally undesirable options for the West on the agenda. The first is to preserve the status quo: to keep Syria isolated and subject it to sanctions, while at the same time trying to mitigate the consequences for the population as much as possible. It includes support for opposition-held enclaves and humanitarian activities. This explains the convening of a conference in Berlin by the opposition. Such a scenario suggests that Syria may turn out to be the same as Iraq in the 1990s, strangled by sanctions. For Western leaders hoping to stop the flow of refugees and extremists, this is undesirable.
The second option is even less acceptable: reconciliation with Assad, it will allow Russia and Iran to strengthen. A number of Western and Arab experts have already argued that this is the only real course of action. It makes sense to allow the Syrian economy and the state to recover, and not to push it to collapse, which will give a new impetus to the flows of migration and general instability in the region. The approach is that Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle will benefit from any easing of sanctions, but at least it can make Syria and the region more stable.
Today, it seems extremely unlikely that any Western leader will risk normalizing his relations with Damascus. The Group of Seven considers the presidential elections illegitimate and opposes any normalization of relations, the US administration continues its policy of sanctions pressure. Based on this, the status quo is most likely to remain.