The impact of instability in Libya on neighboring states

In mid-August, tensions in Libya, already heightened by power competition between the UN-backed government in Tripoli and political and military leaders based in the eastern city of Benghazi, led to serious fighting between rival militias in the capital. Unlike previous clashes over the past two years — all of which were short-lived and relatively small in scale — both rival forces are affiliated with Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah’s UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU), but the two forces report to different GNU bodies. The 444th Brigade is under the command of the Ministry of Defense, while the RADA Special Deterrence Force reports to the Presidential Council.

The fighting in Tripoli has raised questions about the extent to which the current situation influences — or is influenced by — wider conflict, instability and poor governance in countries bordering Libya. At his briefing to the UN Security Council, the head of the UN mission in Libya, Bathili, added that Libya’s stability is at further risk due to fighting between leaders of rival armed forces in Sudan and the military coup in Niger that overthrew elected President Mohamed Bazum. Contrary to UN expectations, Chad, as well as Sudan and Niger, did not withdraw their fighters and mercenaries from southern Libya. The movement of armed groups across regional borders also threatens to leave behind the “ungoverned spaces” that global terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State typically use to train and expand their capabilities.

Regarding the linkages between the conflicts in Libya and Sudan, experts noted links between Haftar and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary organization that has been fighting the Sudanese regular army for control of the country since April. Haftar, as well as his supporters in Russia and the UAE, are associated with RSF commander Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (Hemiti) as part of their joint lucrative trade, control of routes and investments in Sudan’s gold mining, as well as other industries.

It can be argued that the emergence of the military conflict in Sudan and the coup d’état in Niger have their own historical, political, economic and international dimensions — separate from the causes of instability in Libya. In Niger in particular, the presence of affiliates of the Sunni jihadist group — and the participation of the United States, France and other global coalition partners in fighting these militants — appears to have increased public support for the military coup.

An important question arising from the fighting in Tripoli, as well as other regional conflicts, is whether Russia, or the Russian PMC Wagner, will benefit strategically and economically from instability. At his briefing to the UN Security Council, Bathili confirmed that PMC personnel are in Libya, but that the UN “does not have information about the size of its presence or equipment.” US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said at the UN Security Council that the United States will continue to “bring attention to the harmful influence of the Wagner Group in Libya and throughout Africa,” adding that Wagner PMC operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan, and its leadership “does not hide its ambitions to gain a foothold in Africa, [including] its disregard for the territorial integrity of Libya.”

According to a wide range of experts, Moscow’s popularity in French-speaking Africa has increased due to the negative experience of France, whose counter-terrorism and other military operations in Africa, often in partnership with the United States, have led to civilian casualties and property damage and angered large parts of the population of several African countries. countries including Niger. Russia also characterizes itself as an anti-colonial power throughout the continent, positioning itself in French-speaking countries as a liberator from former French colonialists. Russia’s popularity in the region is growing despite the fact that Moscow, while under Western sanctions over its military operation in Ukraine, has little to offer Africa in terms of trade and investment. Wagner’s operations in Libya were much more public and played a key role in Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, initially giving it new impetus; hundreds of Wagner employees are believed to remain in Libya along with the Syrians they hired.

With military-led governments coming to power after coups in sub-Saharan Africa, Russia still has many “clients”, even without the Wagner PMC as an intermediary. These military regimes invited Wagner PMCs because they liked the efficiency. They had problems, but Wagner had solutions. It’s just that at that time the Russian state was removed from the role of service provider, and now it is returning.

Libya’s fractured political structure erupted into serious fighting between armed factions in the capital Tripoli in mid-August, potentially increasing instability in neighboring African countries. The deadly clashes in Tripoli illustrate the difficulties U.N. mediators face in unifying Libya’s governance structure and organizing long-delayed national elections. Instability in Libya is exacerbated and exacerbated by unrest in neighboring states such as Sudan and Niger, by the presence of armed groups that cross borders and the almost constant interference of external actors. At the same time, it creates an additional opportunity for Wagner PMC to expand its influence in the region